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Maximilian de Gaynesford 
Philosophy and Literary Criticism: 
Responding to In the Heart of the Country 
 
Abstract 
This chapter argues that some literary texts call for the attunement of 
philosophy and literary criticism. De Gaynesford begins by explaining what 
attunement is: a mutually shaping activity in which we really do philosophy 
in doing literary criticism. This implies differences between philosophy and 
literary criticism that run at least as deep as the usual disciplinary and 
classificatory boundaries. But it is also consistent with an essential feature of 
attunement: that it be a single, unified activity. The chapter then gives various 
reasons for thinking that Coetzee’s In the Heart of the Country (1977) calls for 
attunement. The question of what a responsible reading procedure for this 
novel should be, given that it may simply be read as fantasy, is one specific 
feature of the novel which encourages and even requires that we adopt an 
approach that makes philosophy and literary criticism a single, unified 
activity. Two further features which call for an attuned approach concern two 
basic themes of the novel: the silencing of the narrator and her claims to being 
regarded as a person of integrity. In pursuing these themes, de Gaynesford 
moves from reflecting on attunement to practising it, in two separate studies. 
In the first, he deploys a combination of philosophy and literary criticism to 
analyse the metaphor that the narrator uses for herself: that of the spinning 
spider. It is mainly in the guise of ethics that philosophy enters here. 
Longstanding philosophical arguments connect integrity with such qualities 
as being united in agency, or true to one’s self, or remaining free from taint. 
Yet the figure of the narrator shares none of these features. Like a Beckett 
character, she is highly unstable and suspicious of any attempt to define her 
identity. As de Gaynesford argues, though, reading the text with a literary 
critical attention to the felt quality of her textual performance – as opposed to 
merely a philosophical ‘example’ – places pressure on these definitions of 
integrity. While the narrator may have little stability as a character, she does 
not emerge as mad or incoherent, but instead as passionate and determined. 
Coetzee’s text therefore qualifies John McDowell’s argument in Mind and 
World that we would be merely ‘spinning frictionlessly in the void’ without 
rational relations to the world. The narrator’s form of ‘spinning’, in which she, 
spider-like, spins ideas and stories about herself, complicates our conception 
of what is required for integrity. In de Gaynesford’s second study, he deploys 
a combination of philosophy and literary criticism to analyse the narrator’s 
use of brackets, the form of punctuation in which she seems most at home. 
The areas of philosophy called on here are philosophy of language 
(understanding what brackets are, what functions they perform), philosophy 
of action (understanding what kinds of action brackets can perform), 
metaphysics (understanding the ways that Coetzee reconfigures the plight of 
the peculiarly Cartesian rationalist) and epistemology (what we might know, 
or fail to know, in making judgements about the world from a sideways-on 
perspective). In the final section, de Gaynesford shows how attunement can 
offer what Martha Nussbaum has called on philosophically-minded critics to 
provide, and raises a number of further questions that send us between the 
practice of attunement and reflection on that practice. 
 
I   Attunement 
Some literary texts call for the attunement of philosophy and literary 
criticism. I have argued for this elsewhere in relation to poetry.1 But it is true 
also of some prose fiction, and here I argue for it in relation to J. M. Coetzee’s 
In The Heart Of The Country (Heart henceforth2). I shall first sketch out what I 
mean by attunement, offer various reasons why I think Heart calls for it, and 
then pursue some of these reasons to see how attunement might work out in 
detail. 
By attunement, I mean a mutually shaping approach in which we 
really do philosophy in doing literary criticism. By ‘doing philosophy’, I mean 
analyzing material in genuinely philosophical ways, with the prospect of 
changing the way we think about things in general. By ‘doing literary 
criticism’, I mean adopting a genuinely critical approach, with the prospect of 
changing the way we respond to literary works. And I mean ‘mutually 
shaping’ in a strong sense: attunement is a single, unified activity. 
If this makes it seem that the normal disciplinary and classificatory 
boundaries between philosophy and literary criticism reflect deeper 
differences between them, then that is accurate enough. Very often, and not 
simply in seminar rooms, we are struck by three things: the different kinds of 
question that philosophy and literary criticism tend to ask, the different 
objects on which they tend to focus their attention, and the different modes of 
attentiveness they tend to focus on those objects. For example, a paradigmatic 
philosophical question in this area is ‘What is literature?’, one that literary 
critics are content to say is not a literary question.3 Given such a question, the 
                                                        
1 See ‘The Seriousness of Poetry’, Essays in Criticism, 59, 2009, 1-21; ‘Speech 
acts, responsibility and commitment in poetry’ in Peter Robinson (ed.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Contemporary British and Irish Poetry (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 
pp. 617-37; The Rift in the Lute: Attuning Poetry and Philosophy (Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming). 
2 References throughout are to the reprinted, currently available edition 
(London: Vintage, 2004). 
3 Derek Attridge ‘Introduction: Derrida and the questioning of literature’ Acts 
of Literature ed. Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992) pp. 1-29; p. 1. Some 
philosophers would also deny that it is simply a philosophical question; see 
focus tends to be on the essence of literature, and the mode of attentiveness 
frames itself around the need to identify a few very general differences 
between what does and what does not count as such. Paradigmatic literary 
critical questions, on the other hand, are those that enable us to get to grips 
with the literary content of particular works. Given such questions, the focus 
tends to be on collecting and then relating very many specific features of that 
work to each other, and the mode of attentiveness frames itself around the 
need to persuade us of the existence and relevance of those features to some 
reading or set of possible readings. These divergences go some way to 
explaining why it is that philosophy often changes the way we think about 
things in general but rarely affects the way we respond to particular literary 
works, and why it is that the reverse is true of literary criticism. 
If there are such differences between philosophy and literary criticism, 
it may seem problematic that attunement presents itself as a single, unified 
activity. But attunement is like walking in this respect, also a single unified 
activity. Someone able to walk would normally be able to move each of their 
two legs independently of each other, but they would have to unify these 
movements to engage in what would count, at least standardly, as walking. In 
the same way, someone able to attune philosophy and literary criticism 
would normally be able to appreciate literature and do philosophy 
independently of each other, but they would have to unify these activities to 
engage in what would count as attunement. Appreciating literature and 
doing philosophy contribute equally to this one exercise. The contribution is 
mutually shaping, with one constantly affecting and responding to the 
position and force of the other. So attunement contrasts with approaches 
which take a pre-existing philosophical outlook and impose it on literature, or 
which take a pre-existing critical outlook and impose it on philosophy.4 
Attunement is to these affairs what walking is to hopping. 
In attunement, philosophy takes literary criticism as an opportunity to 
exercise itself, and vice versa. How? As a starting point, and only that, it is 
clear enough that appreciating literature as such has intimately to do with 
what language is, what it does and what it is for, just as philosophy as such 
has intimately to do with these same questions. On the one hand, these 
questions invoke a good deal of philosophy. On the other hand, abstract 
ingenuity and formal resourcefulness alone are rarely enough to answer 
                                                                                                                                                              
Derrida ‘Is there a philosophical language?’ in Points…Interviews 1974-1994 
ed. Elizabeth Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) pp. 216-27; p. 
217. I agree, for reasons that are our business here: it is a question that calls 
for the attunement of literary criticism and philosophy. 
4 Toril Moi is rightly concerned about the first model, which is common in 
attempts to bring philosophy and literature together; ‘The adventure of 
reading: Literature and Philosophy, Cavell and Beauvoir’ (2011, 125-40). 
them. Sensibility and receptivity to the varied uses of language are also called 
for, capacities that are sustained and developed by appreciating literature. 
Building on this commonality, it is possible to find mutually enhancing ways 
of appreciating literature and doing philosophy, rather than simply using one 
to illustrate or ornament the other. 
This is a brief, stratospheric and necessarily inadequate way to make 
these points, lacking nuance and carefulness. Greater subtlety and precision 
should come as we proceed, and in the only way possible: by practising 
attunement in relation to specific literary works. 
 
II   Attunement and In The Heart Of The Country 
It may be possible to practise attunement on any literary work. But of some 
we may say that they call for attunement—that their content is such as to 
encourage, perhaps even to require, that we engage in this single, unified 
activity. Heart belongs to this category for reasons we shall now examine. 
One of the most compelling has been raised and acutely shaped by 
Derek Attridge. If he is right, ‘there is nothing in the entire narrative from 
start to finish that, in the final analysis, could escape the possibility of being 
read as fantasy’.5 So, he asks, what would a ‘responsible reading procedure’ 
for such a fiction be? Just to see this problem for what it is, let alone to go 
about answering it, one has to cross backwards and forwards between 
collecting many specific details of the narrative and assessing their 
significance for our reading procedure, asking what a ‘responsible’ procedure 
would be, sharpening the answer for this particular occasion so that it is 
capable of taking account of these specific details that we have begun to 
appreciate, and then using that procedure to adjust what we look out for, 
recognizing new details as significant, relating them in new ways, then 
sharpening the procedure again to take account of what we have now 
learned, and then using it to identify and assemble new details, and so on, 
back and forth between philosophy and literary criticism. This is the attuning 
of poetry and philosophy, a process that is at once systematic and cumulative. 
And Coetzee’s novel calls for it, if Attridge is right about what Heart has it in 
mind to ask. 
Another reason for acknowledging that Heart calls for attunement is 
that one of its major themes does so.  When the novel was first published in 
its English version6—by Martin Secker and Warburg Limited in 1977—the 
dust-jacket set the scene: 
                                                        
5 J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading (London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2004) p. 28. 
6 ‘English version prepared by the author’ (London: Martin Secker and 
Warburg Ltd, 1977) Copyright page. In the South African version 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1977), the dialogue was in Afrikaans. On the 
Stifling in the torpor of colonial South Africa, trapped with his serfs in 
a web of reciprocal oppression, a lonely sheepfarmer makes a bid for 
private salvation in the arms of a black concubine, child-bride of his 
foreman. 
This weird sensationalism—it belongs to a Wilbur Smith novel—is chiefly 
notable for its fantastically skewed perspective: there is no mention of the 
narrator7, not even a space left for her, though she is the central character in 
what is narrated, the figure whose development is the subject-matter of the 
novel, the only one whose thoughts and responses are considered along with 
her actions.8 And yet there is also something appropriate about this silencing 
of the narrator.9 For this is the nub at which the novel worries away: partly 
the way in which a speaker may be silenced, robbed of voice, left speechless, 
and partly the way in which that same speaker may nevertheless silence 
others or control the silence, deciding when (and when not) to be silent.10 As 
Coetzee comments, ‘[the narrator] is an anomalous figure: her passion doesn’t 
belong in the genre in which she finds herself’.11 Just to see the problems that 
the novel thus sets for itself, and for us, is to cross backwards and forwards 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘disturbing’ effects of this ‘switching of languages’—for a South African 
reader—see Derek Attridge J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading (London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2004) pp. 22-3 
7 Preferable to the more rarified ‘speaker’ since she has, so essentially, a story 
to tell. 
8 For the blurb in the South African version, Coetzee advised that Ravan Press 
use a review from the Irish Times, one that does focus on the narrator and her 
‘delusions’ (see Peter D. McDonald The Literature Police: Apartheid Censorship 
and its Cultural Consequences Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 p. 311). 
Coetzee himself was responsible for the Secker and Warburg blurb it seems 
(conversation with Peter McDonald). 
9 The sense of ‘silencing’ in play here wavers, just as ‘mute’ does, between a 
dampening of sound (e.g. a trumpet-mute) and a cutting out of sound (e.g. a 
‘mute button’). And it is worth asking why we are comfortable with a word 
that could mean either, when—so we might assume—it is so very important 
to know which is meant. Is it, perhaps, that it is convenient to avoid having to 
say which? 
10 Heart 7-8, 28-9, 39. Coetzee’s discussions of censorship are relevant here 
(Giving Offense: Essays on Censorship Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), 
particularly his carefully attuned response to Catherine MacKinnon’s claims 
that the pervasiveness of pornography has worked not only to subordinate 
but to silence women (‘The harms of pornography’ in Giving Offense pp. 61-
82). 
11 Interview with David Attwell Doubling The Point ed. David Attwell 
(London: Harvard University Press, 1992) p. 62. 
between collecting specific details about the complexities of silencing and 
assessing their significance for the economies of self-fashioning and self-
destruction, between noticing just and unjust actions and asking what 
conceptions of justice enable us to arrive at these judgements, developing our 
answers so that we are capable of recognizing more and better evidence for 
these judgements, of proceeding from clearer and sharper conceptions, and so 
on, back and forth. 
Heart’s dealings with integrity—its nature and complexity, what it 
requires and how it is sustained, what weakens it and what destroys it—are 
another reason for thinking that the novel encourages and requires us to form 
a single, unified activity out of philosophy and literary criticism. On the one 
hand, the narrator is presented as a person of integrity. Indeed, this is one of 
the most striking features of Heart. It can best be appreciated in conjunction 
with the silencing theme. The narrator counters her silencing with attempts to 
silence others and to control her own silence, where this qualified exercise of a 
qualified control is an aspect of her integrity. On the other hand, it is difficult 
to see exactly how this can be the case. On the usual conceptions, the narrator 
is anything but a person of integrity. She does not seem at all a unified, 
integrated person. She is not a person who has a true self to be true to. She is 
not an uncorrupted person, innocent, free from taint. This problem is related 
to another: how is the integrity of the narrator made manifest? For the manic 
monologue-form of Heart seems anything but promising as the expression of 
a person of integrity. It often seems closer to Yeats’ description of Ulysses: 
‘neither what the eye sees nor the ear hears, but what the rambling mind 
imagines from moment to moment.’12To recognise these problems is to cross 
between noticing specific details of the narrative and assessing their 
significance in the light of various conceptions of integrity, sharpening the 
answers so that they can make sense of these details, sharpening our sense of 
the integrity that is in play here. 
So this is another reason why Heart calls for attunement. To pursue the 
integrity theme in a literary critical way, getting to grips with the literary 
content of the novel, is to be constantly attentive to questions of philosophical 
significance, where pursuing these questions sends us back into a more acute 
search of the literary material. 
 
III   The Spinning of the Spider 
Heart calls for attunement. We know something about what this means and 
why it holds. But we have yet to appreciate what attunement might look like 
in practice, what shape an inquiry might take if it formed a single, unified 
activity out of philosophy and literary criticism. That is our task in this section 
                                                        
12 Quoted in James Joyce Richard Ellmann revised edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982) pp. 530-1. 
and the one following, where we shall pursue some of the themes we have 
touched on. 
Start with a detail. The narrator likens herself to a spider—‘a black 
widow spider’13 and develops the metaphor in one particular direction: ‘I 
have always felt easier spinning my answers out of my own bowels’.14 This is 
partly a pun no doubt, converting anger at representations of her state (‘Do I 
feel rich outrage at my spinster fate?’) into something more positive, the spin-
ster (‘When I was a little girl (weave! weave!) in a frilled bonnet I would sit all 
day in the dust’).15 And it reflects the resolve of the narrator (‘Prolong 
yourself, prolong yourself, that is the whisper I hear in my inmost.’).16 The 
spider may also be prompted by Francis Bacon’s well-known characterisation: 
‘rationalists, like spiders, spin threads out of themselves’, by contrast with 
empiricists who, ‘like the ants, merely collect and use’.17 
‘Those are the antagonists’18: this is how the narrator introduces 
herself, her father and his new wife, as if there were no protagonist. And in 
some ways there is not. Not in the sense in which, say, Descartes’ Meditations 
lacks a protagonist (that the particularities of the ‘I’ are gradually stripped 
away, so that it becomes a voice without much individuality, making it 
possible for any reader to slip into the role). This narrator is always to the 
fore, with all that makes her individual. Rather, it is that the story leaves no 
room for a protagonist. She is so overwhelmingly self-critical—and the story 
is so much that of her self-criticism—that she can only figure in the role of 
antagonist, at once the opposing and opposed force. In and around her, the 
protagonist role is silenced. 
Though the narrator is to the fore with all the particularities that 
Descartes strips away, she negotiates a context that is in many ways like that 
of Descartes’ meditator, distrustful of others and of her environment, thrown 
back on her own resources, particularly her rich inner mental life.19 
The complexity here is figured in various ways, but the main point can 
be simply illustrated. The central character is known to us throughout as ‘I’ 
and is named for us only towards the end—as ‘Miss Magda’20—by another 
character and in such a way that we may even doubt whether this really is her 
name. Without a certain name, she recedes somewhat, but into a silence that 
                                                        
13 Heart p. 43; also pp. 64, 75. 
14 Heart p. 150. 
15 Heart pp. 5, 6. 
16 Heart p. 6. 
17 Bacon, Novum Organum, tr. P. Urbach and J. Gibson (Chicago: Open Court, 
1994) Book 1, aphorism 95, paragraph 64. 
18 Heart p. 1. 
19 Heart pp. 4, 59, 137-8, 150. 
20 Heart p. 111. 
she may herself have chosen, and one that is in part protective—since being 
named gives one salience, but also grants others power over one. 
This complexity may direct us to the usual philosophical questions: is 
knowledge possible under such constraints, and if so how? Because the 
narrator has some special faculties, perhaps? But what is of equally deep 
significance to our understanding of the novel is the way the narrator herself 
conceives of this complexity, grapples with the epistemic condition in which 
she recedes into a partly protective silence, by presenting herself under the 
metaphor of the spinning spider, at the centre of a world of her own making, 
steadfast, resolute, intense, single-minded, passionately devoted to her task: 
There is no doubt about it, what keeps me going … is my 
determination, my iron determination, my iron intractable risible 
determination.21 
Steadfastness, resolution, passionate intensity: according to many 
philosophers—John Rawls, Alasdair Macintyre, Michael Slote, Lynne 
McFall—to have such characteristics is to be a person of integrity.22 That the 
narrator is such a person is something that comes across strongly to the 
reader, despite her acknowledged weaknesses of character and rationality. 
(Many of these are exaggerated or playful, e.g. ‘How can I be deluded when I 
think so clearly?’)23 And our appreciation of this coheres with Coetzee’s own: 
in resisting the temptation to interpret the narrator as mad, what he insists on 
is precisely her ‘passion’ and ‘intensity’ and ‘all-embracingness’, calling it a 
‘species of love’.24 
Some think of integrity in other ways: as essentially a matter of being 
united in agency25, or of being true to one’s (‘true’) self26, or of remaining free 
                                                        
21 Heart p. 19. 
22 John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). 
Alasdair Macintyre After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985). Michael Slote 
Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Lynne McFall 
‘Integrity’, Ethics, 98, 1987, pp. 5-20. 
23 Heart p. 137. Note how her confessions of ignorance about philosophy (p. 
19) are offset later by her ability not only to quote but to confront passages—
of Novalis (p. 138), Nietzsche (p. 139), Hegel (p. 141), Weil (p. 141), Rousseau 
(p. 146), Pascal (p. 146). Some passages, for example pp. 38-9, show a 
knowledge of Wittgenstein. 
24 Interview (with Derek Attwell) Doubling The Point p. 61. Coetzee moves 
swiftly in a short conversation from ‘[she] may be mad (if that is indeed your 
verdict), but I, behind her, am merely passionate’ to ‘(I see no further point in 
calling her mad)’. 
25 For example, Christine Korsgaard (Self-Constitution, OUP, 2009); John 
Cottingham ‘The Ethics of Self-Concern’, Ethics, 1991, pp. 798-817; Gabrielle 
Taylor ‘Integrity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
from taint.27 The narrator is not in a position to satisfy these requirements, and 
this tells us a good deal about her. Too damaged to count as united in agency, 
she is not integrated, intact or whole. Too sceptical of herself and others, she 
is scornful of the aim to be true to oneself, to be identified with one’s actions, 
motivations, projects. Too conscious of her own complicity in injustice, she 
does not mischaracterise herself as pure, innocent, decent. 
Indeed, the narrator is particularly sensitive to perceived taint 
(‘wherein does my own corruption lie?’; ‘I am corrupted to the bone with the 
beauty of this forsaken world’28) and her monologue is replete with various 
ways of talking about it—ways of talking of other human beings as ‘low-
grade people, degenerate types, Untermenschen, the unfit, slave races’; 
‘phrases involving blood (blood-consciousness, pure blood, tainted blood, etc.)’; 
‘certain terms from the fringes of the science of heredity (taint, flaw, 
degeneration)’ which Coetzee notes elsewhere have been ‘put a stop to’ by the 
Nuremberg trials and what they revealed.29 
These contrasts also tell us a good deal about the kind of integrity that 
the narrator does manifest. We might regard it as a virtue of hers that she 
possesses integrity in spite of the fact that she does not satisfy these other 
requirements. But we may also think that it is precisely because she does not 
satisfy them—because she acknowledges her fragmentary nature, her lack of 
a self to be true to, her complicity in injustice—that she manifests integrity, or 
at least the particular kind of integrity she does manifest. 
Much of the narrative is constructed in such a way as to replicate the 
narrator’s conception of herself as a spinning spider, working away and 
producing material out of itself. This is the basic form: an idea or image will 
occur fleetingly in one section, a side-thought only, and will then become the 
                                                                                                                                                              
volume, 55, 1981; Valerie Tiberius The Reflective Life: Living wisely within our 
limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
26 For example, Bernard Williams ‘ ‘Persons, Character and morality’ in his 
Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp. 1-19; Harry 
Frankfurt ‘Identification and wholeheartedness’ in his The Importance of what 
we Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) pp. 159-76. 
27 For example, Sissela Bok Lying (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978). 
28 Heart pp. 64-5; p. 151 
29 White Writing (London: Yale University Press, 1988) Ch 6 p. 136. There need 
be no conflict here though the narrator does speak of a ‘Führer’ (Heart p. 11). 
Internal evidence e.g. the fact that she is unsure whether there were bicycles 
when she was young (Heart p. 2), makes it plausible that the events described 
take place prior to the Nuremberg trials. Trying to work out when and where 
the events of Heart take place caused the South African censors considerable 
trouble; see Peter McDonald The Literature Police: Apartheid Censorship and its 
Cultural Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 313. 
principle thread of the next section, in which a developed form of that idea or 
image will occur fleetingly, and then become the principle thread of the next, 
and so on. This is an appropriately internal reason (or justification) for the 
prose style in Heart, which is far distant from the ‘uniformly plain, flat, 
unadorned prose, in which nothing so luxurious as a metaphor emerges, or a 
striking employment of syntax, or a word of more than a few syllables’ which 
Joyce Carol Oates finds in Coetzee’s The Childhood of Jesus.30 
This ‘spinning’ form is established early and becomes increasingly 
complex. As illustration, consider the early sequence §§3-6. In §3, the narrator 
‘extracts’ a ‘faint grey image’ which she immediately works up into 
something more material, from a grey image to an image of something grey, 
her ‘faint grey frail gentle loving mother’. 
She extracts the image ‘from one of the furthest oubliettes of memory’ 
where this word for a secret dungeon whose access is limited to a trapdoor in 
the ceiling may recall John Locke’s famous description of the mind as a ‘dark 
room’, ‘a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little openings left, to 
let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without’.31 The use of 
‘oubliette’ to suggest such a room may betray a taste in the narrator for 
sensationalist Romantic literature; Walter Scott adopted the word into 
English, in Ivanhoe in 1819.32 
The image remains fleeting and diaphanous here, but it becomes the 
central theme and subject of the succeeding section (§4) as the ‘frail gentle 
loving woman’, the mother whose dying is poignantly described there. In §4, 
the fleeting sense of her compassion is introduced, which will become the 
central theme in §6, the ‘womanly warmth’ against which the narrator 
contrasts herself as ‘a zero, null, a vacuum’—where it is possible to see this 
nullity also as an inheritance from her mother, reading the threefold 
description of herself as ‘a zero, null, a vacuum’ (in §6) beside the threefold 
description of her moribund mother as ‘patient, bloodless, apologetic’ (in §4). 
And from here—§6— the original image is spun further, again using the 
original ‘grey’: what was in §3 a ‘faint grey image’ and then a ‘faint, grey, frail 
gentle loving mother’ becomes in §6 a description of herself as ‘a turbulence, 
muffled, grey, like a chill draft eddying through the corridors, neglected, 
vengeful’. Spinning makes this transition possible, a self-reflection that moves 
from disembodied image through to full embodied human presence and back 
again to something disembodied.33 
                                                        
30 New York Times Review, 2014.   
31 An Essay concerning Human Understanding Book II, Ch 11 § 17. 
32 Entry under ‘oubliette’ in Oxford English Dictionary. 
33 This theme of ‘embodied’ and ‘disembodied’ prose is evidently of 
considerable significance to Coetzee; he uses it to distinguish between those 
works of Beckett which ‘matter’ to him.  Interview with David Attwell 
The practice develops many complexities in the course of the 
monologue. For example, the ‘impulse… telling me to hide in a corner like a 
black widow spider’ in §85 prompts the theme for the next section ‘But the 
truth is that I have worn black widow-weeds longer than I can remember’ 
and then doubles back to re-invoke the insect in §86: ‘for all I know I was a 
baby in a black diaper waving my rickety little legs’. 
The narrator is conscious of her spinning practice and increasingly 
reflective about it; it makes her impressively self-reliant but it has its 
limitations which embarrass her: ‘That is what she gets from me, colonial 
philosophy, words with no history behind them, homespun, when she wants 
stories’.34 So there is an odd combination of resignation and pridefulness 
about her concluding comment: ‘I have always felt easier spinning my 
answers out of my own bowels’.35 
The spinning form stands in clear relation to the use of numbered 
sections (§§1-266) which play so large a role in determining the appearance 
and form of Heart. Coetzee reflected later that his decision to use such sections 
was influenced by his interest in ‘film and / or photography’, and particularly 
‘how rapidly narration could be carried out’ in film. This interest led him to ‘a 
heavy concentration’ on ‘cutting, montage’ in Heart, whose sequences are 
numbered precisely to assist this ‘feature of technique: they act ‘as a way of 
pointing to what is not there between them’.36 The numbering certainly 
intensifies the effects of spinning in Heart. By creating semi-discrete sections 
with gaps in between, ideas can be spun very rapidly. A faint image or idea 
can be introduced in the sidelines of one and then appear fully embodied and 
dominant in the next, where the reader can be relied on to fill in the transition, 
just as a film-watcher manages cuts. 
John McDowell’s phrase ‘spinning frictionlessly in a void’37 seems apt 
for this. In part, this is because it is precisely in a void that the narrator’s 
spinning takes place. As she herself recognizes (or at least as she presents 
herself; the distinction is necessary because of games played with the 
reliability of the narration), she is forced to live off her own resources, being 
cut off from the rest of the world geographically (she lives in an isolated 
house in a desert region38) and socially (she and her soon-to-be-dead father 
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are exceptions, isolated members of a master class) and emotionally (her 
mother is dead; her brutal father has chosen a young wife inimical to his 
daughter). 
In part, McDowell’s phrase is apt because it is precisely in a frictionless 
way that the narrator’s spinning takes place. As she recognizes (or at least as 
she presents herself), she is in a hopelessly compromised, subordinate 
position, quite powerless to constrain what happens. Her labours, and indeed 
her presence, have little effect on the way things are. Conversely—though this 
is not so constantly part of her self-presentation—the world seems incapable 
of constraining her. In particular, the way things are seems to exert little or no 
influence on the material she spins out. The words we read seem detached, 
self-generating, self-sustaining. So it seems curiously beside the point to ask 
whether or not the narrator gives an accurate depiction of what happens, 
whether her words truly ‘match’ reality. We have the sense that the material 
would have been spun out this way regardless. 
McDowell coined the phrase for another purpose: we would be 
‘spinning frictionlessly in the void’ if our experience failed to provide us with 
rational relations to the world. The metaphor McDowell puts in play is not 
that of an individual working away and producing material from out of itself, 
but of a rotating object, revolving on itself—a perfectly smooth sphere 
perhaps.  ‘Spinning frictionlessly’ in this sense would be a poor or even 
hopeless position for the rational subject to be in, epistemically speaking. To 
be able to think knowledgeably, our thoughts must ‘have a grip’ on the 
world, must ‘gain purchase’ there. To count as such, the knowing rational 
subject must have their experience constrained by the way the world is. 
 When these two senses of ‘spinning frictionlessly in a void’ rub up 
against each other, there is some friction: it becomes a pertinent question to 
ask just how the narrator’s spinning is even possible. She seems to be capable 
of acting in a knowing and rational manner. Either this is only ever mere 
appearance, or empiricism is wrong: there need be no rational constraint by 
the world if a subject is to act in a knowing and rational manner. Spinning 
(spider-spinning) is possible whilst spinning (sphere-spinning) frictionlessly 
in a void. The first option is unappealing: we may think the narrator mad, or 
touched by madness, but to suppose her incapable of ever acting in a knowing 
and rational manner is inconsistent with the text and would drain it of 
interest. To adopt the second option and thus challenge McDowell’s modest 
form of empiricism is to ask ‘how does the narrator spin whilst spinning?’ 
This inquiry into the spider and its spinning is in its opening stages. 
But we have done enough to answer the question set. For we have seen how 
the theme encourages and requires us to form a single, unified activity out of 
philosophy and literary criticism. The combination has revealed a variety of 
means through which the narrator’s integrity is achieved, and centrally by an 
instrument that develops the figure of the narrator. She meets the temptation 
to spin frictionlessly in a void, an object revolving on itself without any ‘grip’ 
on the world, with attempts to re-conceive herself as a spinning spider, 
working away and producing material out of itself. And this integration of 
her self-conception as a spin-ster with her control over language, over her use 
of the monologue-form, opens up an alternative conception of integrity, based 
around being constant and resolute, which seems to be possible for a person 
without the usual markers of integrity—being unified, being authentic, being 
uncorrupted. In short, we have moved from talking about attunement to 
practising it.  
 
IV   Brackets and what they Dis-enclose 
The attunement that Heart calls for can be practised in many ways. We have 
just used it to work on a metaphor, that of the spinning spider. We shall now 
use it to work on an element of punctuation. 
 Start again with a detail. The narrator describes herself as living ‘inside 
a skin inside a house’.39 Matching this, she seems most at home in brackets. It 
is in what she places there that we seem to get closest to her thoughts, her 
voice, her tone. Consider the close of the novel: 
I have never felt myself to be another man’s creature (here they come, 
how sweet the closing plangencies), I have uttered my life in my own 
voice throughout (what a consolation that is), I have chosen at every 
moment my own destiny, which is to die here in the petrified garden, 
behind locked gates, near my father’s bones, in a space echoing with 
hymns I could have written but did not because (I thought) it was too 
easy.40 
The narrator uses the brackets to comment ironically on common forms (‘the 
closing plangencies’) which press almost inescapably on her own ‘voice’, even 
while she claims this voice as her own, so that we wonder how much of a 
‘consolation’ this ownership really is. The brackets also serve as a correlative 
to the ‘locked gates’ and the echoing space they enclose, a resonance which in 
the final occurrence—‘(I thought)’—returns the voice to the rationalist theme, 
turning the essential feature of the Cartesian meditator (‘I think’) into the past 
tense, making what is indubitable (if I am doubting, I cannot doubt I am 
thinking, because to doubt is to think) into what is thoroughly dubitable (how 
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can I be certain that once I thought? The fact that I am doubting now, in the 
present, is no guarantee of what happened in the past). 
One use the narrator has for her brackets is to reflect, and reflect on, 
various aspects of her silencing. There are, for example, her own attempts to 
be silent: 
I close the door, sit down…This is the irreducible, this is my room (I 
settle deep in my chair)…41 
where the brackets help figure seclusion of self prior to intense thought (like 
Descartes setting out on his Meditations, or the eponymous hero strapped into 
his chair at the start of Beckett’s Murphy.) 
There are the narrator’s attempts to silence others: 
(I have said nothing of the girl’s nakedness. Why?)42 
where this is made complex by what the brackets contain, a saying of what is 
not being said. 
 There is the narrator’s being silenced: 
Having failed to make my shouts heard (but am I sure they did not hear 
me? Perhaps they heard me but found me uninteresting, or perhaps it is 
not their wont to acknowledge communications), I turned to writing.43 
where this being silenced is as much a matter of others not listening, not 
being unreceptive. 
There is the segregating of the narrator’s narrative, played out in part 
in that concluding passage with its ironic detachment: 
I have never felt myself to be another man’s creature (here they come, how 
sweet the closing plangencies), I have uttered my life in my own voice 
throughout (what a consolation that is)44 
where the brackets sustain the sense that her narration is wholly removed, of 
a different order, much as in Shakespeare’s Sonnet 49: 
Against that time (if ever that time come) 
When I shall see thee frown on my defects45 
where the bracketing in the first line underlines the sense of what is there 
enclosed: that unlike the events which we might expect to be described in 
poem, this is one whose time may not come, and hence we are to regard it as 
appropriately segregated, its existence as belonging to another order. 
 Heart complicates the way brackets segregate, for example to double 
what is described 
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It is at times like these that I notice (what a helpful device a mirror is for 
bringing things into the open, if one can call it a device, so devoid of 
mechanism) how thickly the hair grows between my eyes46 
There is a Beckett-like comedy to this: the reflective passage set in the midst of 
the everyday. And the brackets seem to work like the mirror they speak of, a 
helpful device which brings into the open what the surrounding sentence 
would cover over. 
Brackets also reflect and offer their own commentary on the central 
themes of the novel. There is, for example, the general spinning economy 
When I was a little girl (weave! weave!) in a frilled bonnet…47 
and resoluteness, the particular form the narrator’s integrity takes 
(Yet what is it in me that shrinks from the light?... Prolong yourself, 
prolong yourself, that is the whisper I hear in my inmost.)48 
and the narrator’s attempts to recede, to draw back, and to draw away 
(and what do I, poor provincial blackstocking, know about philosophy, as 
the lamp gutters and the clock strikes ten?). 49 
From these examples, we can see how the narrator employs brackets not only 
to register and face up to the way she is silenced, but to exert an equal and 
opposite set of forces, to push back, setting up her own sphere in which she 
can exercise silence herself, both in silencing others and in choosing to silence 
herself. She uses brackets to counter being placed out-of-play by her father 
and step-mother and servants (as well as by various geographical, social and 
economic features of her situation), enabling herself to remain alongside 
them. Again, she uses brackets to counter being viewed by others in an 
excluding way, enabling herself to view the whole situation which contains 
others from within that whole situation, as one amongst its various occupants 
of it. And this exercise of her capacity to think and act in an including way, by 
means of her uses of brackets, is also an aspect of her integrity. This use 
enables her to meet being segregated with attempts to find value in being 
unique, in being regarded as unique. It enables her to meet being contained 
by other people and by various features of her situation with attempts to re-
conceive containment—as inclusion rather than restraint. 
These uses of brackets call for philosophical reflection. By creating an 
inside, brackets raise the question of an outside. They form their own 
commentary. Nesting one text with another enables one voice to be nested in 
another. They are, if Coleridge is right, ‘the drama of reason’; ‘no work of 
impassioned and eloquent reasoning ever did or could subsist without 
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them’.50 In its use of brackets, Heart complicates Dr Johnson’s dictum about 
parentheses—that in them, a sentence is ‘so included in another sentence, as 
that it may be taken out without injuring the sense of that which encloses it’. 
The basic idea retains a strong hold on theorists of punctuation. Strong 
contrary evidence in usage has not got rid of the idea but seems only to have 
modified it. Eric Partridge is representative: ‘The essence of all parentheses is 
that … they explain or modify, but they do not determine the sense’.51 The 
idea is retained in the philosophy of linguistics with the notions of ‘bracket 
absorption’ and ‘bracket erasure’.52 If the narrator’s brackets enclose her 
deepest self, its reflections, then Johnson’s dictum is a very effective means of 
silencing her. But equally it may be that she uses the dictum for her own 
purposes: brackets enable her to say things, to ‘get away’ with doing so. 
Brackets have particular relations to silence and silencing, as we have 
seen. Christopher Ricks develops the thought in insisting that brackets speak 
to the eye rather than the ear, that their use draws attention to silence as 
something beyond what is voiceable.53 But Ricks is somewhat evasive here 
because he does seem to admit that something about brackets is voiced: 
[brackets] belong with those signs of punctuation which the voice 
cannot sufficiently utter…the voice is not able to make adequately clear 
(adequate in both delicacy and clarity) whether the parenthesis is 
bracketed off, comma’d off, or dashed off.54 
The point here is a good one: that the voice has no clear means of indicating 
that it is brackets, rather than some other parenthetical device (like dashes, 
commas), that are being used. Ricks agrees that punctuation which is 
markedly durational can be uttered. But he denies that brackets are 
essentially a mark of duration. They indicate a relationship that may or may 
not have a durational dimension. This is why he says ‘they speak to the eye 
and not to the ear’.55 Still, Ricks seems to me too absolute in all this. When he 
says ‘they speak to the eye and not to the ear’, what he might have said (and 
done the careful distinguishing work then necessary) is that they may speak to 
the ear, but in a way that differs in various respects (and here they are…) 
from their speaking to the eye. 
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Heart offers opportunities to pursue this more discriminating 
approach, once we attune our literary and philosophical attention. In her use 
of brackets, for example, the narrator sometimes takes on a sideways-on 
perspective to the world, seeming to regard herself as circumscribed within a 
boundary with the world outside, but nevertheless capable of making 
judgements about that world. This is a metaphor that John McDowell adopts 
to portray a common philosophical conception of the way mind and world 
relate.56 Sometimes, however, the narrator uses brackets to take up the 
perspective that McDowell contrasts with this sideways-on perspective. Like 
her, he is particularly interested in the case where one works at making 
someone else ‘intelligible’.57 We can find others initially ‘opaque’58, but 
nevertheless retain the sense that the world this other person is engaging with 
is a shared world, so that we come to a standpoint from which we can join 
that other person in directing a shared attention at the world.59 And this also 
is figured in the narrator’s use of brackets. On occasion, they do not operate 
as a figure of the boundary one might have to break through, but as an 
opportunity for conscious self-reflection on the fact that one’s world is a 
shared world. For example, 
A woman with red blood in her veins (what colour is mine? A watery 
pink? An inky violet?) would have pushed a hatchet into his hands and 
bundled him into the house to search for vengeance.60 
Here, whilst calming the violence of the image, the brackets also serve to set 
the narrator’s sense of herself within an overall context that includes her sense 
of others. Brackets are a means of uniting these impressions. 
This inquiry into brackets and what they dis-enclose is still in its early 
stages. But we have done enough to see what an inquiry would look like if it 
formed a single, unified activity out of philosophy and literary criticism. And 
we have begin to appreciate the breadth of the philosophy that an attuned 
reading of Heart calls upon. Not just ethics and moral psychology, which the 
focus on silencing and integrity makes central, but also philosophy of 
language (understanding what brackets are, what functions they perform), 
philosophy of action (understanding what effects brackets can achieve and 
how, what kinds of action they can perform), metaphysics (understanding the 
ways that Coetzee reconfigures the plight of the peculiarly Cartesian 
rationalist) and epistemology (what we might know, or fail to know, in 
making judgements about the world from a sideways-on perspective). 
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V   Further Reflections 
We have now seen two examples of what attunement looks like in practice. 
The experience raises further questions that send us from practice back to 
reflection. Where does attunement end? Is there some priority between 
literary criticism and philosophy, some privilege that one has over the other 
in terms of approach or point of entry? Is this unified activity a mixture of 
philosophy and literary criticism or a compound of them? Does philosophy or 
literary criticism change its character within the activity that is attunement? 
Are there particular kinds of literary work that call for attunement—do they 
form a recognizable type, and if so, in virtue of what? Or are all literary works 
such that they call for attunement, and if so, what is it about all such works 
that makes this the case? These are deep questions that raise complex issues 
and each deserves a chapter of its own. I cannot deal with them here, but they 
are worth raising now so as to offer possible routes beyond this chapter. 
 What I can offer by way of conclusion is a kind of checklist, following a 
recommendation by Martha Nussbaum. She laid down various requirements 
for any philosophical study of Shakespeare if it is to ‘make any contribution 
worth caring about’.61 If we generalise these requirements, with one 
amendment, we arrive at a basic conception of what it is that attunement sets 
out to achieve. And my claim is that we have been meeting these 
requirements in our approach to Coetzee’s Heart. 
The first requirement is that an inquiry must really do philosophy, 
‘wondering and pondering in a genuinely philosophical way’. This is 
something we have made a start at with the discussion of silencing and 
integrity, of what brackets are and what they do, of the metaphysics and 
epistemology associated with the figure of the narrator. Second, an inquiry 
must really do literary criticism, ‘changing the way we see the work’. Again, 
this is something we have made a start at, noticing the dramatic salience of 
the pinning metaphor and of brackets in Heart, thus developing and changing 
the way we see the novel, both in particular places and as a whole, 
reconfiguring the elements, sharpening attentiveness, unlocking principles of 
composition, doing literary criticism in doing philosophy. Third, an inquiry 
must explain why philosophers need literary texts, what they supply that 
straightforward philosophical prose does not, why ‘the philosopher must 
care’. Our reflections on Heart go some way towards meeting this 
requirement. In thinking about what is at issue in silencing and being 
silenced, in comparing and contrasting different conceptions of integrity, in 
appreciating the effects that brackets achieve, there is much that a literary text 
can convey which ordinary philosophical prose finds difficult or impossible—
a sufficiently rich sense of what is at stake for the narrator in her silenced and 
silencing position, in the complexities of her exercise of integrity, in her 
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reasons for retreating into the use of brackets. But a full study would also 
show other uses: that there is a real prospect of improving our philosophy of 
language analysis of brackets, for example, if we use literary works like Heart 
to appreciate what they are for, what uses they have. 
That exhausts Nussbaum’s requirements, but we ought to add a fourth. 
An inquiry must explain why texts like Heart or authors like Coetzee need 
philosophers, what philosophy supplies that straightforward literary criticism 
does not, why we must care about philosophy. Again, our reflections on Heart 
only go some way towards meeting this requirement, but it is already evident 
what a full study might show: that there is a real prospect of improving our 
understanding of the novel if we use philosophy to appreciate the ethical and 
metaphysical and epistemological questions it raises. Sometimes philosophy 
will give us reason to revise a critic’s view of the novel—its dealings with 
philosophy are not restricted to a kind of intellectual flummery in the 
quotations that occur towards the end, as is often assumed, but inform the 
metaphors and uses of punctuation which the narrator adopts, thus helping 
to create the conditions in which she is able to perceive herself and her 
situation. Sometimes philosophy enables us to offer a reasoned explanation 
for the impression that a critic was only able to register and record—it is often 
said that the novel constructs a narrator possessing a multi-layered self, but 
philosophy helps demonstrate how and why this is so. These are isolated 
cases, dependent on the context provided by one or two features of the novel 
alone—its use of the spinning metaphor, of brackets. A philosophically-
informed full study could revise our view of the novel as a whole and give 
reasoned explanations for what we perceive. 
For example—and this is just one option, though an important one—
philosophy can recognise the ways in which Heart acts as a reflective study of 
uses of language, singularly and uniquely equipped to provide its suitably 
directed appreciators with philosophical insights into those uses. The 
opportunity to appreciate philosophical distinctions and discriminations in 
the novel can improve our ability to discriminate features of philosophical 
significance. And this opportunity to grapple anew with philosophy in turn 
heightens our capacity to appreciate what is rich and subtle in the novel, 
which returns us more richly provided to pursue philosophy, from where we 
can go back more generously supplied to appreciate the novel, and so on, 
back and forth. This vigorous spiralling—circling, but with progress—is what 
I mean by attuning literary criticism and philosophy. 
 
